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DON'T TREAD ON ME TO HELP ME:
DOES THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FAMILY COURT ACT OF

2001

VIOLATE

DUE PROCESS By EXTOLLING THE "ONE
FAMILY, ONE JUDGE" THEORY?
Jim Moye*

"I now know that making good decisions about families requires
more than common sense; it requiresa great deal of expert knowledge
.... [F]rom my experience, I have come to the certain conclusion that
a trained and experienced judge specializing in family law and presiding over a family law case from beginning to end can obtain a better
outcome."'

"Unfortunately, a new court alone cannot provide a guarantee
against another Brianna tragedy. People do bad things to people.
What we can guaranteeis that each child will get the attention that they
deserve on the issues of safety and well-being as they go through our
court."2
OSTER care-the federally-regulated, state-administered system
carrying responsibility for abused, neglected, abandoned, orphaned
or mentally-impaired children-is in turmoil. Examples of the
troubled system can be found all over the United States. In the 1980s and
1990s, more than a dozen states' child welfare agencies were placed in
federal receivership.3 In Florida, thirty-seven children died of abuse or
* B.A. University of Southern California, 1995; J.D., The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law, 1999. Assistant General Counsel, The Child and Family Services Agency, Washington, D.C. The author would like to dedicate this article to
two family members: Maxine Land, my maternal grandmother who passed away in July
2004. Her warmth, beauty and strength is a model by which we should all lead our lives.
The second and newest member of my family is Olivia, my daughter. I love her and hope
that she achieves everything that she can imagine.
The ideas shared in this article do not reflect the position of the Child and Family Services Agency or the District of Columbia government.
1. District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 2657 Before the
Subcomm. on D.C. of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement
of Scott McCown).
2. Sylvia Moreno, Born of Tragedy, Family Court Begins to Grow Up; Tribunal Created After Toddler's Death Attracts Judges Devoted to Child Welfare, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
2002, at T08.
3. See Brian Bowling, Effect of Comp Bankruptcy Unclear, If Legislation Fails, a Federal Trustee Could Operate Fund, CHARLESTON GAZETTE AND DAILY MAIL (WV), Mar.
11, 2003, at C1.
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neglect while under state care, even though workers were warned of dangers to the children. 4 The State of Michigan admitted that it lost track of
over 300 children in its child welfare system. 5 In Georgia, the child welfare system has seen its share of troubles. According to published reports, hundreds of children died after coming into the state's foster care
system. 6 An investigation by the Georgia Bureau of Investigations into
the deaths of thirteen children in the state's care revealed that "the child
welfare agency's sloppy work, bad decision(s) and widespread inefficiency contributed to 10 [sic] of those deaths."' 7 In New Mexico, a volunteer board created by state legislation affirmed the fact that in the year
2000, children were forced to have lengthy custody stays and multiple
placements, and were not receiving requisite mental health attention. 8 It
was also revealed that thirty-one percent more foster children stayed in
foster care five years or longer in 2000 than were in the system for the
same length of time in 1997. 9
Litigation was instituted in a few states to expose problems in the foster care system. In Tennessee, a child advocacy organization, in conjunction with several Tennessee law firms, sued the state child welfare
authority claiming that "Tennessee's foster care system was 'grossly mismanaged and overburdened,' and that the agency had failed to ensure
that the children were cared for properly."1 0 The state settled the class
action lawsuit by agreeing to a number of reforms and allowing court
oversight." A suit was filed in the state of Washington in 1999 on behalf
of thirteen current and former foster children, alleging that the state had
failed to provide stable homes, had subjected the children to multiple
moves, and failed to protect those same children from neglect and abuse
4. See State Eye on Abused Kids, Editorial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 16, 2003,
at

8.

5. See id.
6. See Ron Martz, Child Welfare Fixes Expected to be Costly, Rebuilding Crippled
System Could Take Three Years, Says State's Human Resources Commissioner, ATLANTA J.
& ATLANTA CONST., July 20, 2000, at B1.
7. Id. The Human Resources Commissioner for the State of Georgia, Audrey Horne,
whose department oversees the child welfare system, hypothesized it could take up to
three years to begin fixing the system and would also cost $20 million for fiscal year 2001 to
start the reforms. Id.
8. See Deborah Davis, Group Highlights Foster-CareProblems, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Jan. 20, 2002, at B1.
9. See id.
10. Emily Yellin, Tennessee to Alter Foster Care, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC),
May 20, 2001, at A8. The suit also stated that many children had been moved ten or more
times while in foster care and that there had been no concerted effort to find permanent
homes for the children. See id. The suit pointed out that caseworker contact was a problem, and that these problems were more acute for African-American children. See id.; see
generally Jamie Satterfield, State Foster Care on Road to Reform, Settling Suit Improves

Odds, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, May 19, 2001, at Al.
11. See Yellin, supra note 10, at A8. Specifically, the state agreed to spend $30 million
dollars over the next five years to improve the system, to improve the training of its
caseworkers, to limit the number of cases each caseworker handles to a maximum of
twenty, to limit the number of children assigned to a foster home, to significantly increase
the number of children adopted within the first year of eligibility, and to follow strict timelines written into the settlement. See id.
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while under the state's care.12 Almost two years later, the state settled
the lawsuit.1 3 Specifically, the state agreed to pay $1.3 million in damages
to the thirteen plaintiffs. 14 However, a separate class action suit grew out
of the plaintiffs' original claim, which is still pending litigation. 15
One child welfare system that has come under considerable criticism is
in Washington, D.C. In 1989, the District of Columbia government was
sued by child welfare advocates for failing to properly maintain its child
welfare system. 16 The suit was ultimately successful, and in 1995 Judge
Thomas Hogan, the presiding federal judge in the class action lawsuit,
appointed Jerome Miller as the federal receiver for the child welfare system. 17 His term was less than successful as he was unable to make any
effective changes in the system.1 8
Two years later, in 1997, Ernestine Jones was appointed to succeed Mr.
Miller as the federal receiver. 19 Her term was equally difficult. First, by
20
fiscal year 2000, the city's child welfare agency had a $30 million deficit.

To make matters worse, Ms. Jones was cited for contempt and arrested by
federal marshals for failing to attend a court hearing at the District of
Columbia Superior Court. 21 After her arrest, Ms. Jones filed a federal
lawsuit against the District of Columbia Superior Court, charging that she
was not under the auspices of the District of Columbia Superior Court. 22
After terse negative public reaction to the lawsuit, Ms. Jones withdrew
23
the suit.

12. See Ruth Teichrob, State's Foster-CareSystem to Be Put on Trial, Suit Claims Children Abused by Many Moves, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 20, 1999, at Al.
13. See Ruth Teichrob, State to Pay Foster Kids $1.3 Million; but Settlement Doesn't
Meet Lawsuit's Goal of Reforming System, Attorney Says, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Sept. 29, 2001, at Bi.
14. See id. The settlement provides $100,000 to each of the children named in the
lawsuit. "The money will be placed in a trust fund until each individual is 30 years old, but
a court-appointed trustee can release funds earlier for health care, shelter, clothing or education." See id.
15. See id.
16. See Jonetta Rose Barras, Taking Back the City, Mayor Retrieves D.C. Agencies
from Judges, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at A21.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Jonetta Rose Barras, Rewards for Failure, Agency Budget Grows while Youths
Suffer, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A23.
21. See Don't Mess with Judge Christian, Editorial, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2000, at A22.
A neglect case involving an abandoned twenty-month old baby was before Superior Court
Judge Kaye K. Christian. See id. Judge Christian believed that Child and Family Services
was mishandling the case and summoned the social worker on the case, the social worker's
supervisor, and Ms. Jones. See id. None of the parties attended the hearing. See id. A
second summons was issued, and the social worker and supervisor attended, but not Ms.
Jones. See id. Lawyers for Child and Family Services contended that Judge Christian did
not have jurisdiction over Ms. Jones as federal receiver because she was appointed and
overseen by a federal court. See id.
22. See Sari Horwitz & Scott Higham, Child Welfare Chief Drops Lawsuit; Jones
Targeted Local Judges, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2000, at Bi.
23. See id. "The chief of the District's child welfare agency has withdrawn her federal
lawsuit against D.C. Superior Court, backing down from a tense confrontation with local
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Subsequently, the case that brought the most negative attention to the
District of Columbia child welfare system revolved around twenty-threemonth-old Brianna Blackmond. During the 1999 Christmas holidays,
Brianna was returned to the custody of her biological mother without a
hearing. 24 Unfortunately, there were a number of miscommunications in
the case.25 The social worker on the case was not in favor of sending
Brianna or her sister back home for the holidays, but there was no report
in support of that opinion. 26 The lawyer representing the biological
mother incorrectly informed the presiding judge that all parties were in
agreement to return the children to the biological mother, who was cognitively limited, for the holidays.2 7 The presiding judge did not hold a hearing on the matter but instead signed an order returning the children
29
home. 28 Two weeks later, Brianna died at the hands of her godmother.

Brianna's godmother was charged with the murder, and Brianna's mother
30
was charged as an accessory to the crime.
After these and other incidents, Congress became intimately involved
with reforming the child welfare system in the District of Columbia. Congress had already passed the Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 1997 to
impose national child welfare reform. 3 1 In order to rectify what was seen
as a deteriorating situation in the Washington, D.C. child welfare system,
Congress specifically targeted the District of Columbia Superior Court
and its Family Division to make sweeping changes. Congress used its
power to pass the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001.32 The

legislation brought many changes to the District of Columbia Superior
Court, including changing the name of the Family Division, regulating the
number of judges in the Division, changing the qualifications needed to
serve, and most importantly, implementing the "one family, one judge"
model. 33 The "one family, one judge" model means that families with
matters in the Family Court will have all matters consolidated before a
single judge. 34 In theory, any legal issue that would normally be heard in
the Family Court would still be heard in the Family Court, but would be
heard by the same judge who has heard other Family Court matters re35
lated to the family.
judges and calling into question why she filed the unusual legal challenge in the first place."

Id.

24. See Sari Horwitz, "Failureafter Failure", Foster System Betrayed Brianna, WASH.
POST, Feb. 21, 2000, at Al.

25. See id.
26. See id. See also Children's Stories, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at B9.
27. See id. The biological mother has an Intelligence Quotient of 58 and had a history
of child neglect.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
32. Pub. L. No. 107-114, 115 Stat. 2100 (2002).
33. See id.
34. See Cliff Collins, Family Court, Oregon Style, OREG. STATE BAR BULLETnN, Jan.
2001, at 13.
35. See id.
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Some critics have charged that the "one family, one judge" model violates due process because judges may have access to information that
would normally be inadmissible, and the entire social history of a family
is brought to bear in a proceeding. 36 Theoretically, the best way to cure
such inequities would be to force a judge to recuse himself from any further proceedings involving the family. Of course, this violates the spirit
and intent of the "one family, one judge" philosophy. The "one family,
one judge" model has yet to be challenged as a due process violation at
the highest court of any state or the United States Supreme Court.
This Article explores the issues surrounding the District of Columbia
Family Court Act of 2001 and specifically examines whether the "one
family, one judge" methodology violates due process. Part I breaks down
the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001. Part II looks at both
United States Supreme Court and D.C. Court of Appeals cases with regard to due process and judicial recusal. Part III compares the jurisprudence against the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 and
determine whether due process is violated by "one family, one judge."
Part IV makes policy recommendations with regard to this issue and the
District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001. The Article ultimately
concludes that the "one family, one judge" model introduced in the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 does not violate due process
and can be a useful tool in providing better family court service.
I. JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL:
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FAMILY
COURT ACT OF 2001
The District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 brought a number
of changes to the Family Division of D.C. Superior Court. The first and
most notable change was that the Family Division became known as the
"Family Court."'37 The first section sets out the requisite qualifications
for judges, including issues related to the number of judges, 38 qualifica40
tions, 39 and tenure.

Additionally, the legislation changes the position and title of Hearing

Commissioners. 4 1 Their titles are changed to "Magistrate Judges," and
their role in the new Family Court is specifically defined.42
The most important change in the District of Columbia Family Court
Act of 2001 is that all issues related to marriage and divorce, child custody, adoption proceedings, paternity proceedings, proceedings concerning children who are delinquent, neglected or in need of supervision,

36. See Anne Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts, Tempering Enthusiasm with Caution, FAM. CT. REV., Oct. 2002, at 435.
37. Pub. L. No. 107-114 (2001), § 11-902(a).
38. See id. at § 11-908A.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Pub. L. No. 11-1732.
42. See id.
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commitment of the mentally ill, and proceedings under the Interstate
Compact for the Placement of Children ("ICPC"), are to be under the
43
jurisdiction of the Family Court.
The new law also specifically provides that all family members with
court proceedings have those cases heard by one judge, 44 any Family
Court case would remain in the Family Court until the case is disposed
of,4 5 and if a party is assigned to a Family Court judge and has other
46
actions, then those actions should be heard by the same judge.
Clearly, this is a major philosophical change because it gives the Family
Court carte blanche to consolidate one family's multiple matters into one
docket under one judge. In a practical sense, a hypothetical scenario
could look as follows: Family X has a pending divorce matter. In the
midst of the divorce, a neglect case is opened against one of the parents.
After the neglect case has been opened, one of the children in the family
commits a crime and has a juvenile case brought before the court. Judge
Y, who had original jurisdiction over the pending divorce case, would
now also have jurisdiction over the neglect and juvenile cases. Under the
old Family Division system, three different judges would have heard the
three differing matters.
1I.

A TOUGH QUESTION TO ANSWER: WHEN SHOULD
A JUDGE RECUSE HIMSELF FROM A CASE?

The United States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, and the American Bar Association have all weighed in on the
issue of judicial recusal. For purposes of the instant discussion, it is important to analyze each entity's position.
A.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

It is well settled in Supreme Court case law that the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments entitle defendants to a
"neutral and detached judge. '47 The Supreme Court has stated that a
fundamental requirement of due process is that a litigant is entitled to
"[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal. '48 There are three major Supreme Court
cases on the issue.
The first of these cases was Tumey v. Ohio.49 In Tumey, a defendant
was charged with possessing intoxicating liquor and was brought before
the town mayor, who also served as the judge. 50 The defendant immediately moved to have the mayor disqualified as the trier of fact, but the
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.

46.
47.
Jerrico,
48.
49.
50.

See id.
See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); see also Marshall v.
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 532-35 (1927).
See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
See id. at 515.
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motion was denied. 5 1 The defendant proceeded to trial, where he was
convicted, fined and imprisoned. 52 The case was heard by the Court of
Common Pleas for Hamilton County, Ohio, where the defendant's conviction was overturned. 53 The case was appealed by the state to the court
of appeals. 54 The court of appeals overturned the Court of Common
Pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. 55 The defendant attempted to have the case heard by the state supreme court, but was
unsuccessful.

56

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case. In a majority
opinion written by Chief Justice Taft, the Court reversed the judgment
and remanded the case. 57 Justice Taft wrote in the opinion that "it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to
the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substan58
tial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case."
The second important Supreme Court case was Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp.5 9 In Liljeberg, the case centered on a lawsuit
brought by Health Services Acquisition Corporation against John
Liljeberg, Jr.60 The case was heard in federal district court by Judge Robert Collins. 61 The judge, sitting without a jury, ultimately ruled in favor
of Liljeberg. 62 The decision was affirmed by the court of appeals. 6 3 Ten
months after the court of appeals case, Health Services Acquisition Corporation acquired information that the original trial judge served on a
board that had been negotiating with Liljeberg for the purchase of a tract
of land. 64 Health Services Acquisition Corporation filed a motion to
51. See id. The defendant moved to have the mayor disqualified, because otherwise
the defendant would suffer a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id.
52. See id. The defendant was convicted of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquors
in Hamilton County, Ohio, fined $100, and ordered imprisoned until he could pay the fines
and fees. See id.
53. See id. The Court of Common Pleas found that the mayor should have been disqualified, thus overturning the conviction. See id.
54. See id. at 515.
55. See id.
56. See id. "On May 4, 1926, the State Supreme Court refused defendant's application
to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. The defendant then filed a
petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the Mayor's Court
and of the Appellate Court be reversed, on constitutional grounds. On May 11, 1926, the
Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable
constitutional question was involved in the cause." Id.
57. See id. at 535.
58. Id. at 523.
59. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
60. See id. at 850. Health Services Acquisition Corporation brought an action against
Liljeberg for ownership of the St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. Apparently, Judge Collins served on the Board of Trustees for Loyola
University. Id. At the time the case came before Judge Collins, Loyola University had
been in negotiations with Liljeberg over the purchase of a tract land for a hospital. Id.
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have the trial judges decision overturned, which the same judge denied. 65
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the decision and remanded the
case back to a different trial judge. 66 On remand, the district court made
specific factual findings, but once again denied Health Services Acquisi68
tion Corporation's motion. 67 Once again, the court of appeals reversed.
The third and final case of importance was Liteky v. United States. 6 9 In
Liteky, three defendants were on trial for various acts committed at Fort
Benning Military Reservation. 70 Before their trial, the defendants filed a
motion to have the judge disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 71 The
Additionally, these negotiations were publicized to the Board of Trustees and had been
discussed at various meetings. Id.
65. Id. at 850-51. "Based on this information, respondent moved pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the judgment on the ground that Judge Collins
was disqualified under § 455(a) at the time he heard the action and entered judgment in
favor of Liljeberg." Id.
66. See id. at 851. Specifically, the Court remanded the case so that a lower court
could determine "factual findings concerning the extent and timing of Judge Collins'
knowledge of Loyola's interest in the declaratory relief litigation." Id.
67. See id.
On remand, the District Court found that based on his attendance at Board
meetings Judge Collins had actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in St. Jude
in 1980 and 1981. The court further concluded, however, that Judge Collins
had forgotten about Loyola's interest by the time the declaratory judgment
suit came to trial in January 1982. On March 24, 1982, Judge Collins reviewed
materials sent to him by the Board to prepare for an upcoming meeting. At
that time-just a few days after he had filed his opinion finding for Liljeberg
and still within the 10-day period allowed for filing a motion for a new trialJudge Collins once again obtained actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in
St. Jude. Finally, the District Court found that although Judge Collins thus
lacked actual knowledge during trial and prior to the filing of his opinion, the
evidence nonetheless gave rise to an appearance of impropriety. However,
reading the Court of Appeals' mandate as limited to the issue of actual
knowledge, the District Court concluded that it was compelled to deny respondent's Rule 60(b) motion.
Id.
68. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 851. The court of appeals observed that Judge Collins
should have recused himself immediately upon having his memory refreshed, and that he
should have remembered the Liljeberg/St. Jude conversation. See id.
69. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
70. Id. at 542. The defendants were indicted for allegedly violating 18 U.S.C. § 1361,
which in relevant part reads:
Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property
of the United States, or of any department or agency thereof, or any property
which has been or is being manufactured or constructed for the United
States, or any department or agency thereof, or attempts to commit any of
the foregoing offenses, shall be punished as follows: If the damage or attempted damage to such property exceeds the sum of $1,000, by a fine under
this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both; if the damage
or attempted damage to such property does not exceed the sum of $1,000, by
a fine under this title or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1361 (West 2004).
The defendants were indicted for allegedly committing vandalism and, inter alia, spilling
human blood on the walls of the military reservation. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 542.
71. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 542. The law reads, in relevant part, that:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
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(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or
such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal
financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have
the meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages
of litigation;
(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;
(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator,
trustee, and guardian;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest,
however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds
securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the
judge participates in the management of the fund;
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or
civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by
the organization;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance
company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar
proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only
if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value
of the interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in
the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially
affect the value of the securities.
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] shall accept from the
parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only
under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a
full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.
(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice,
judge, magistrate [magistrate judge], or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter
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defendants moved to have the judge disqualified because the same trial
judge convicted one of the defendants of various misdemeanors committed during political protests at the same military base. 72 The defendants
argued that the judge's behavior during the previous trial made his
recusal necessary. 73 The judge denied the defendants' motion and proceeded with the trial. 74 After the court refused to allow the defense to
discuss certain topics and issues in its opening statement, the defendants
renewed their motion for judicial disqualification. 75 The motion was
again denied, and eventually, the defendants were convicted of the
charges. 76 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, that court affirmed the trial court's rulings. 77 The Supreme
78
Court granted certiorari.
has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has
been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the
matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a
financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge,
magistrate [magistrate judge], bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as
the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the
grounds for the disqualification.
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (West 2004).
72. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 542.
73. See id. at 542-43.
Petitioners claimed that recusal was required in the present case because the
judge had displayed "impatience, disregard for the defense and animosity"
toward Bourgeois, Bourgeois' codefendants, and their beliefs. The alleged
evidence of that included the following words and acts by the judge: stating
at the outset of the trial that its purpose was to try a criminal case and not to
provide a political forum; observing after Bourgeois' opening statement
(which described the purpose of his protest) that the statement ought to have
been directed toward the anticipated evidentiary showing; limiting defense
counsel's cross-examination; questioning witnesses; periodically cautioning
defense counsel to confine his questions to issues material to trial; similarly
admonishing witnesses to keep answers responsive to actual questions directed to material issues; admonishing Bourgeois that closing argument was
not a time for "making a speech" in a "political forum"; and giving Bourgeois
what petitioners considered to be an excessive sentence. The final asserted
ground for disqualification-and the one that counsel for petitioners described at oral argument as the most serious-was the judge's interruption of
the closing argument of one of Bourgeois' codefendants, instructing him to
cease the introduction of new facts, and to restrict himself to discussion of
evidence already presented.
Id.
74. Id. at 543.
75. Id. Before the trial, defense counsel informed the court that he intended to focus
his arguments on certain political events ongoing in El Salvador. Id. The judge informed
defense counsel that he would allow him to state the defendants' political purposes in the
opening statement. Id. During opening arguments, defense counsel began to discuss certain political events in El Salvador. The judge stated that he would not allow a discussion
of the events in El Salvador and instructed defense counsel to discuss only those issues
related to the evidence. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found that "matters arising out of the course of judicial
proceedings are not a proper basis for recusal." Id.
78. Id.
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The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, affirmed the convictions and, in doing so, made several important rulings. 79 The Court found
that neither judicial rulings alone 8° nor opinions formed by judges based

on facts introduced in the normal course of proceedings constitute the
81
basis for bias or partiality.

B.

D.C.

COURT OF APPEALS

The controlling case in the District of Columbia on the issue of judicial
recusal can be found in Scott v. United States.82 Scott revolved around a
criminal defendant whose case had been assigned to a District of Columbia Superior Court trial judge. 83 Criminal violations of the District of

Columbia Code are tried by the United States Attorney for the District
84

of Columbia, a subsidiary of the United States Department of Justice.
During the criminal defendant's trial and sentencing, 85 the trial judge had
been engaged in negotiations with the United States Department of Justice for a position. 86 At no time during the trial or sentencing did the trial
judge disclose to the parties that he was in such employment negotiations. 87 Two weeks after being sentenced by the trial judge, the defendant learned of the judge's employment negotiations in a local D.C.
newspaper. 88 Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to vacate the conviction and sentence, pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110,89 arguing that the

79. Id. at 544-56.
80. Id. at 555. "First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a
bias or partiality motion." Id.
81. Id. "Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Id.
82. 559 A.2d 745 (D.C. 1988).
83. Id. at 747. The matter was assigned to Judge Tim C. Murphy on November 15,
1984. Id.
84. See id. Pursuant to D.C. Code 23-101(c): "(c) All other criminal prosecutions shall
be conducted in the name of the United States by the United States attorney for the District of Columbia or his assistants, except as otherwise provided by law." D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-101(c) (1981).
85. Scott, 559 A.2d at 747. The jury found the defendant guilty of assault with an
intent to kill, and the judge sentenced the defendant to imprisonment for twelve to thirtysix years and fined him $500. Id.
86. Id. "During Scott's trial and sentencing, Judge Murphy was engaged in discussions
with the United States Department of Justice about employment as an attorney in the
Executive Office for United States Attorneys." Id. Judge Murphy was ultimately offered a
job with the Justice Department on February 6, 1985, and resigned his position as a sitting
Associate Judge in the D.C. Superior Court on February 8, 1985. Id.
87. Id. at 747-48.
88. Id. at 748.
89. Id. D.C. Code § 23-110, in relevant part, reads:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court claiming the
right to be released upon the ground that (1) the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the
District of Columbia, (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move
the court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.

1532

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

judge's failure to disclose such negotiations violated American Bar Association standards and denied the defendant due process of law. 90 The
motion, heard by another trial judge, was denied. 9 1
The D.C. Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court's
judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.92 The court made two
distinctive rulings on the issue of judicial recusal: 1) the American Bar
Association's Code of Judicial Conduct applies to judges of the District of
Columbia Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
and 2) a judge should93disqualify himself even if there is the mere appearance of impropriety.
C.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

Finally, the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct
speaks to the issue of judicial recusal. The Judicial Code of Conduct for
the District of Columbia Courts mirrors the ABA's judicial conduct
code. 94 Under Canon 3(c) of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, a jurist
"shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." 95 Additionally, the ABA code also points at a
number of other instances, albeit not inclusively, when a judge should
recuse himself. Those instances include: (1) where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against a party or has personal knowledge of contested evidentiary facts; (2) where the judge served as counsel or his firm
served as counsel on the controversy; (3) where the judge served as a
governmental lawyer and advised on the case in controversy; (4) where
the judge, the judge's spouse, or minor child has a financial interest in the
outcome of the interest; or (5) where the judge, the judge's spouse, or a
person related to either within the third degree is or has consulted on the
96
matter in controversy.
D.C. CODE ANN.

§ 23-110(a) (1981).

90. Scott, 559 A.2d at 748.
91. Id. "The motion was denied by Judge Reggie Walton, citing Womack v. United
States, 129 U.S. App. D.C. 407, 395 F.2d 630 (1968), on the ground that it would be inappropriate and unnecessary to resolve Scott's claim since a direct appeal was pending and
Scott could raise the issue of judicial disqualification in his appeal from the denial of his
motion." Id.
92. Id. at 746, 756.
93. See id. at 748-49.
"A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." The necessity for recusal in a case is premised on an objective standard .... [A] judge must recuse from any case in
which there is "an appearance of bias or prejudice sufficient to permit the
average citizen reasonably to question [the] judge's impartiality." The objective standard is required in the interests of ensuring justice in the individual
case and maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process
which "depends on a belief in the impersonality of judicial decision making."
Neither bias in fact nor actual impropriety is required to violate the rule.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
94. See generally CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE DIsTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURTS, Preface at v (1995).
95. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(c)(1) (1991).
96. See id.
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III. WHEN DUE PROCESS MEETS JUDICIAL REFORM: DOES
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FAMILY COURT ACT OF 2001
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS WITH ITS "ONE FAMILY,
ONE JUDGE" METHODOLOGY?
The central question at issue is whether the "one family, one judge"
doctrine of the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 creates due
process concerns by requiring that one judge hear all of the legal matters
involving one family. As discussed earlier, constitutionally, every individual has a right to a "fair and impartial" judge. 97 Critics of the "one family, one judge" doctrine utilized in the District of Columbia Family Court
Act argue that questions of fairness and impartiality are non-existent because the judge would have knowledge of a family and draw inferences
from that knowledge which may directly affect his or her ability to fairly
adjudicate a matter. This rationale is flawed for a number of reasons.
A.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FAMILY COURT ACT OF 2001
CREATES A LEGAL EXCEPTION

First, the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 provides a
legal loophole to protect due process and other constitutional concerns.
In the legislation, the "one family, one judge" doctrine is utilized only if it
is legal and feasible. 98 The law contemplates legal problems that may
arise from consolidating numerous cases into one case being heard before
one judge. The legal checks and balance, in essence, is that judges are
freed from consolidating cases if they believe it is not legal, practical, or
feasible. Thus, because judges are not required to consolidate cases
under the "one family, one judge" rubric, the law violates no existing law,
especially not due process.
B.

PREVIOUS ADVERSE DECISIONS ALONE ARE NOT A BASIS
FOR JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION

One reason that the "one family, one judge" model has been criticized
is a fear that if a judge makes an adverse ruling against family members,
the judge will consider the evidentiary basis in future matters. Thus the
family will be denied fairness and impartiality on unrelated matters.
The Supreme Court's decision in Liteky directly dealt with that rationale. As noted above, Liteky involved a criminal defendant who sought
97. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
98. District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-114, sec. 4, § 101,
115 Stat. 2100, 2108 (2002) (to be codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-104). The legislation
reads:
To the greatest extent practicable, feasible, and lawful, if an individual who is
a party to an action or proceeding assigned to the Family Court has an immediate family or household member who is a party to another action or proceeding assigned to the Family Court, the individual's action or proceeding
shall be assigned to the same judge or magistrate judge to whom the immediate family member's action or proceeding is assigned.

1534

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

removal of a trial judge because the judge had served as his trial judge in
a previously-decided matter.9 9 In the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia
noted that "[t]he judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of
the evidence, be exceedingly ill-disposed towards the defendant, who has
been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person."1 00 Justice Scalia
continued "[b]ut the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice,
since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge's task." 10 1
In the instant situation, District of Columbia family court judges are
exposed to positive, as well as negative, information about families. Such
exposure does not necessarily mean that the court will be biased against
the family. Just as in any other court, family court judges are required to
make findings on the record before any major decision can be entered.
The appeals process provides the safeguard against what a family may
perceive to be bias from a judge from previous proceedings. A hypothetical situation may best illustrate this. Family X consists of a father, a
mother, a daughter, and a son. Imagine that Family X has two pending
matters before a District of Columbia Family Court judge: a domestic
relations case and an abuse/neglect case. In the domestic relations case,
there is a pending divorce in which violence between the parents has become a central issue. In the abuse/neglect case, the violent relationship
between the parents is affecting the placement of the children. Before
the court enters any findings in the domestic relations case, a reasoned,
rational, statutory basis must exist for the court to issue any ruling. In the
abuse/neglect context, the court is required to ensure the safety of a child
under its jurisdiction. 10 2 Yet again, before the court can make any decision on placement of the children, it must make comprehensive findings
of fact on the record. If the court's basis for those findings are lacking,
the offended parent is always free to appeal the judge's decision. If the
court's rationales for its decisions are solid, then it would withstand appellate scrutiny. Whatever the case, the court has to make a record and
has to adequately support its decision, regardless of the information it has
been exposed to with regard to the family. Hence, the family is left with
adequate protection from bias.
Another flaw with the stated criticism of the "one family, one judge"
doctrine is the assumption that an adverse decision against a party creates
a bias against the affected party. The problem with that form of reasoning is that favorable decisions would also seemingly create bias in favor of
the affected party. If a judge has made favorable ruling after favorable
ruling, is it then fair to assume that the court has biased itself? The rational answer is no. Critics seemingly ignore the fact that bias and
99. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 542-43.
100. Id. at 550-51.
101. Id. at 551.
102. See generally Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111

Stat. 2115 (1997).
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prejudice do not just exist against a party but also can work for a party.
In reality, in order to establish that a court is biased or prejudiced based
on prior adverse rulings, a pattern of sustained, adverse rulings lacking
any foundation in the law must exist. Only then could a reviewing court
make the determination that a family court judge is biased based on prior
adverse decisions.
C.

Is THE "MERE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY"
DOCTRINE TRIGGERED BY THE "ONE FAMILY,

ONE JUDGE" METHODOLOGY?

Under the traditional notions of legal ethics, if there is the "mere appearance of impropriety," the person in question should recuse himself or
herself from participation in the legal matter.10 3 One may be tempted to
argue that the "one family, one judge" philosophy in the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 triggers the mere appearance of impropriety because a judge has unfettered access to information about the
family. However, that need not be the case.
On a basic level, the underlying belief of the "mere appearance of impropriety" philosophy is that some form of unethical conduct may be occurring. Logically, as applied to the instant matter, there is some basis for
the judge to be recused. As discussed above, a prior adverse ruling by a
judge does not provide an adequate basis for recusal.104 Thus, evidence
would have to show that the judge had a personal, pecuniary, professional, or other interest. 10 5 If such evidence could be obtained, there
seemingly would be no need to analyze the merits of any decision ren-

dered by the court, because the court should have been recused before
rendering the decision. Thus, if a party could not provide such evidence,
recusal would not be a viable option solely because of the "one family,
one judge" methodology utilized in the District of Columbia Family
Court Act of 2001.
IV.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA FAMILY COURT ACT OF 2001
Even though the "one family, one judge" doctrine serves not to violate
due process on its face, a number of policy alternatives could strengthen
the District of Columbia Family Court Act. Five different policy initiatives could make a significant difference in the administration of the controversial doctrine.

103. See generally Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745 (D.C. 1988).
104. See generally Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
105. See generally CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURTS, Preface at v (1995).
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CODIFY JUDICIAL RECUSAL RULES

As stated earlier, the Code of Judicial Conduct for District of Columbia Courts mirrors the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct. As thorough as that may be, a more proactive and progressive
answer lies in codifying judicial recusal rules. The only District of Columbia rule on the books for determining judicial recusal lies in the D.C.
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. D.C. Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule 63-1 states:
Whenever a party to any proceeding makes and files a sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is to be heard has a
personal bias or prejudice either against the party or in favor of any
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned,
in accordance with Rule 40-1(b), to
10 6
hear such proceeding.
The language of the civil procedure rule is very vague and lends
itself to vastly different interpretations. A clearly defined statute would better serve the Family Court. A good example of this
is found in the federal judiciary. Title 28 U.S.C. § 455 is the fed10 7
eral statute which clearly outlines the basis for judicial recusal.
1
0
8
1
0
9
Several jurisdictions, such as Alabama,
Florida,
and Ha106. D.C. SUPER. C. R. Civ. P. 63-1.
107. See supra note 65.
108. See generally ALA. CODE § 12-1-12 (2004). The statute, while short, is quite clear:
No judge of any court shall sit in any case or proceeding in which he is interested or related to any party within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity or in which he has been of counsel or in which is called in question
the validity of any judgment or judicial proceeding in which he was of counsel or the validity or construction of any instrument or paper prepared or
signed by him as counsel or attorney, without the consent of the parties entered of record or put in writing if the court is not of record.
Id.
109. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 38.02 (West 2004). The statute reads:
In any cause in any of the courts of this state any party to said cause, or any
person or corporation interested in the subject matter of such litigation, may
at any time before final judgment, if the case be one at law, and at any time
before final decree, if the case be one in chancery, show by a suggestion filed
in the cause that the judge before whom the cause is pending, or some person
related to said judge by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, is a
party thereto, or is interested in the result thereof, or that said judge is related to an attorney or counselor of record in said cause by consanguinity or
affinity within the third degree, or that said judge is a material witness for or
against one of the parties to said cause, but such an order shall not be subject
to collateral attack. Such suggestions shall be filed in the cause within 30
days after the party filing the suggestion, or the party's attorney, or attorneys, of record, or either of them, learned of such disqualification, otherwise
the ground, or grounds, of disqualification shall be taken and considered as
waived. If the truth of any suggestion appear from the record in said cause,
the said judge shall forthwith enter an order reciting the filing of the suggestion, the grounds of his or her disqualification, and declaring himself or herself to be disqualified in said cause. If the truth of any such suggestion does
not appear from the record in said cause, the judge may by order entered
therein require the filing in the cause of affidavits touching the truth or falsity of such suggestion. If the judge finds that the suggestion is true, he or
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waii l 10 provide good examples of solid state statutory rules regarding judicial recusal. Given the highly contentious nature of cases coming
before the Family Court (such as divorce, child support, abuse, and neglect) it is in the best interest of the court to have clearly defined language
on this issue.

B.

FAST TRACK APPEALS FOR JUDICIAL RECUSAL ISSUES

As a way of insuring fair treatment of every recusal motion filed in the
Family Court, a fast track appeals process could be developed. If a party
files a motion to have a judge recused because of suspected bias or partiality, the presiding judge of the Family Court would automatically hear
the matter. This way, an impartial party handles the matter and is in an
administrative position to weigh the evidence without any question of
partiality. Rationally, this is the most logical way to handle a judicial
recusal motion because it does not force the judge against whom the motion is directed to be put in the awkward position of ruling on his or her
own ability to hear a case. Instead, it gives the judicial officer with the
greatest administrative authority in the Family Court the ability to fairly,
and impartially, hear all arguments without the appearance of partiality.
C.

RANDOM CONFLICTS AUDITS

Another useful tool to quell any possible conflicts may be for the Family Court to conduct random conflict of interest audits. Specifically, the
court could use existing administrative personnel or judges outside of the
Family Court to conduct random audits and determine whether, on its
face, there are any possible conflicts. This is a progressive approach to
the issue. Indeed, such an aggressive approach is necessary because the
judiciary holds a place of public trust and has an ongoing duty to further
public confidence. Such a duty places the court in the unenviable position of "outside the box" thinking, but such thinking is necessary given
she shall forthwith enter an order reciting the ground of his or her disqualification and declaring himself or herself disqualified in the cause; if the judge
finds that the suggestion is false, he or she shall forthwith enter the order so
reciting and declaring himself or herself to be qualified in the cause. Any
such order declaring a judge to be disqualified shall not be subject to collateral attack nor shall it be subject to review. Any such order declaring a judge
qualified shall not be subject to collateral attack but shall be subject to review by the court having appellate jurisdiction of the cause in connection
with which the order was entered.
Id.
110. See generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-7 (2003). The statute, inter alia, states:
No person shall sit as a judge in any case in which the judge's relative by
affinity or consanguinity within the third degree is counsel, or interested either as a plaintiff or defendant, or in the issue of which the judge has, either
directly or through such relative, any pecuniary interest; nor shall any person
sit as a judge in any case in which the judge has been of counsel or on an
appeal from any decision or judgment rendered by the judge.
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the slim constitutional dangers that accompany the "one family, one
judge" doctrine.
Also, given that many of the judges practiced before the Family Division before joining the judiciary, conflicts may arise of which they are not
aware. Random audits of court files would help to detect such conflicts
before one rose to the level of a litigation issue. Random audits would
also relieve the trial judge of being placed in an awkward position. In
essence, because of the court's public duty, the constitutional issues surrounding the "one family, one judge" doctrine, and the real possibility for
conflicts, the random audit system could be a useful tool.
D.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION NOT TO EXERCISE THE "ONE FAMILY,
ONE JUDGE" DOCTRINE

A fourth possible policy shift would be encouraging judges not to utilize the "one family, one judge" methodology if it in any way stands to
retard the progress of the family or any individual cases that may be
before the court. As discussed earlier, judges under the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 are given discretion to not consolidate
cases under the "one family, one judge" methodology.1 11 For instance, if
a judge is not familiar with a certain area of the law such as child support,
rather than consolidating all of the family's cases into the child support
action, the family is probably better off allowing another judge to hear
the action. Even though the basis of "one family, one judge" is to ensure
that families have consistency by utilizing one judicial officer, families
should not be forced to sacrifice expertise for the mere sake of judicial
consistency. Additionally, not utilizing "one family, one judge" may
make it easier for the presiding judge over a family to handle other issues
facing a family. For instance, because there is unlimited power to consolidate cases, a legitimate possibility exists that an unduly burdensome number of cases could be brought before one judge. In the District of
Columbia Superior Court Family Court, multi-child families are not at all
uncommon. With a large family, the judge may legitimately have domestic relations, juvenile, abuse and neglect, and child support issues. Having
one judge address such a large number of issues at one time could be
disadvantageous for the family, because the court may fail to properly
consider each case and give it the time that it deserves. As judicially efficient as "one family, one judge" may be, there is only so much time a
single judge can allot to one family. If there are multiple cases, the judge
has to balance and prioritize those cases, which may serve as an injustice
to other issues for the family in question.

111. See generally District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-114,
115 Stat. 2100.
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CONCLUSION

The District of Columbia Family Act of 2001 made substantial changes
to the Family Division of the District of Columbia Superior Court. Most
importantly, the law brought the "one family, one judge" methodology to
the court. The greatest concern related to the law is whether the "one
family, one judge" methodology violates the due process of those families
standing before the court. The law does not violate due process because
the legislation does not absolutely require that the "one family, one
judge" methodology be used. The concern over previous adverse decisions by the court does not provide a basis for judicial bias and thus
recusal, and the appearance of impropriety argument fails because evidence of pecuniary, personal, or professional interests must exist. The
District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 is far from perfect and the
"one family, one judge" methodology is not without its flaws. However,
the law does not violate the due process of families with cases before
Family Court judges. The law brings a new legal era to the District of
Columbia and more importantly, brings new hope to a much beleaguered
area of the law.
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